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Since the beginning of 2007, three issues have domi-nated domestic Taiwanese politics: the corruptioncases, the selection by the political parties of their
candidates for the 2008 presidential elections, and the
desinicisation campaign (去中国化) orchestrated by the
island’s authorities. This last issue is shaped by strategic and
ideological dimensions. Since the foundation of the DPP,
desinicisation has represented one of the principal demands
of the more independence-minded wing of the party. For its
defenders, it represents the result of a legitimate effort to
refocus the regime of the People’s Republic of China on
Taiwan. It aims to correct the forced sinicisation of the
Taiwanese by the Kuomintang and to liberate a national
identity suffocated by an authoritarian regime dedicated to
the Greater China myth. For its detractors, on the other
hand, this desinicisation effort is based on populist calcula-
tions and on an underlying independence ideology. It will
end up impoverishing Taiwanese culture by cutting it off
from its Chinese roots. Some critics even go so far as to
affirm that complete desinicisation would result in a total cul-
tural void. In this context of a profound division among the
elite, the reform of history textbooks announced in January
2007 by the minister of education, Tu Cheng-sheng((6), has
provoked, as on every political initiative of the DPP govern-
ment, a hue and cry from the opposition and a volley of
applause from the “pro-Taiwanese” political forces. This
stormy debate intensified even more when the government
announced at the beginning of February the resumption of
its campaign to “rectify names”(正名) for state-owned
enterprises, which consists in replacing the reference to
China in their names by a reference to Taiwan. In its
English appellation, the Chinese Petroleum Corporation
(CPC), has become CPC Taiwan. From now on, the
China Shipbuilding Corporation will be called CSBC
Taiwan. The Chunghwa Post Corporation (Chunghwa
means “China”) has been renamed the Taiwan Post
Corporation((7). In the Chinese-language versions, the use of
the word China has been completely abandoned in favour of
Taiwan((8). At the end of February, the authorities discussed
the practical forms for renaming the Chiang Kai-shek
Memorial Hall, one of the major tourist attractions in
Taipei, the Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall((9).
This summary is based first of all on the commentaries by
the island’s pro-independence press to take stock of the
nation-building movement orchestrated by the DPP govern-
ment and the logic that rules it. Nation-building is distinct
from “state-building”. While seeking to maintain stability in
the Taiwan Strait, Chen Shui-bian and his successive gov-
ernments have been extremely prudent as far as state-build-
ing is concerned, while devoting considerable energy to
“Taiwanise” Taiwanese society, considering that it was nec-
essary to “desinify” it for that. This analysis then sets out to
take stock of the criticisms scourging this desinicisation poli-
cy, based on an editorial and two opinion articles published
by renowned academics in the opposition’s daily newspaper
Lienhebao. Interestingly, if the three texts selected are not
totally devoid of cynicism or blistering barbs against Chen
Shui-bian, they seem to forearm themselves against any
accusation of being anti-independence and are keen to pro-
vide reminders of their commitment to the independence of
the Republic of China on Taiwan. Faced with “two Chinas”
or “one China, one Taiwan”, the principle of one China
preached by Beijing is attractive to no more than a silent
majority in Taiwan. 
The new history textbooks used in high schools from the
beginning of the second term in the 2006 2007 school year
have gone through the grinder of the name-change cam-
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6. Born in 1948, the Minister of Education is a historian by training, specialising in the his-
tory of Ancient China. A research fellow at the Academica Sinica until 2000, he became
an advisor to the Ministry of Education in 1994. He drafted several speeches for Lee
Teng hui, in particular those relating to the events of 28 February 1947. In 2000, he was
appointed by Chen Shui bian to head up the National Palace Museum, a position with a
ministerial rank, when he stated that he was committed to the “depoliticisation” of the
collections of the Chinese empire. He was appointed Minister of Education in 2004. 
7. “State run firms begin name change,” Taipei Times, 10 February 2007. 
8. “Half-Baked Name Change, Taiwan,” Taipei Times, 11 February 2007. 
9. “Chang Kai-shek Memorial Hall Must Go: Chen,” China Post, 27 February 2007. The
Ministry of Defence has been engaged in removing the statues of Chang Kai-shek from
military buildings. In September 2006, Taiwan’s international airport, the Chang Kai-
shek airport, was renamed “Taoyuan Airport”.
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paign, one of the hobby-horses of the more independence-
minded wing of the DPP. Thus Sun Yat-sen will no longer
be called the “Father of the Nation” (国父), but Sun Yat-
sen, which, the political opposition says, boils down to dele-
gitimising the Republic of China. Moreover, all the quali-
fiers traditionally used in the Republic of China to designate
mainland China, such as “the Chinese communists”
(中共), “our country” (本国), or even “the mainland”
(大陆), will be replaced by “China”. The founding events
that led to the overthrow of the Qing dynasty and to the
establishment of the Republic of China are similarly target-
ed, such as those at Wuchang, which will no longer be
termed the “Wuchang rebellion” (起义), but the
“Wuchang insurrection” (起事), a term voluntarily more
neutral that no longer seeks, in contrast to the previous
expression, to confer a moral justification on the revolution
against the Qing dynasty. On the other hand, the episode in
which the emperor Qin Shihuang united the Warring States
in 221 BC will no longer be taught. The period of the
Japanese occupation (1895 1945) will also see a change in
description, with the abandonment of the term “occupation”
(日拒), judged too negative, and its replacement by the
wording “Japanese administration” (日治). Finally, the
number of lessons dedicated to Chinese history will once
again be reduced. In reality, this “rectification of names” in
the history textbooks is an amplification of a reform of
greater scope that, starting in 2004, has definitively integrat-
ed a dividing line between the history of Taiwan and the his-
tory of China. 
The editorialist of the Liberty Times accepts the criticism of
an opposition legislator, according to whom this reform can
be compared to a “cultural revolution”. In his view, howev-
er, this is a cultural revolution based on democratic values
and on a “Taiwaness”, and is intended to return to the
Taiwanese their right to see the world from Taiwan, rather
than through the prism of a Chinese nationalism imposed by
force on the Taiwanese by the Kuomintang. For this edito-
rialist, who picks up on a key argument of the Taiwanese
independentists, Taiwanese society has experienced several
invasions: the Dutch, the Spanish, the Ming loyalists of
Zeng Chenggong (Koxinga), the Chinese empire during
the Qing dynasty, the Japanese and, finally, the nationalists
of Chiang Kai-shek. According to this argument, each invad-
er brought with them a set of practices that contributed to
the formation of a specific Taiwanese culture. From this
point of view, Chinese culture is only one component among
several others making up Taiwanese culture. But under the
authoritarian regime of the Kuomintang, all the resources of
the one-party state were employed to “brainwash” the
Taiwanese by imposing a Chinese identity on them, by
crushing any specific characteristics of Taiwanese culture
and by suffocating its diversity. Thus the teaching of history
under the Kuomintang not only reflected the cultural impe-
rialism of the Chinese, that “power derived from the out-
side” (外来政权), it personalised the dictatorial nature of
the occupying regime. In contrast, the reform of the history
programmes adopted by the DPP government is part and
parcel of the democratisation of the island. Now, according
to the Liberty Times editorialist, Chen Shui-bian has a man-
date to implement this reform. His victory in the presiden-
tial elections of 2000 and his re-election in 2004 have com-
mitted him to consolidate the “Taiwanisation” undertaking
and to reinforce the “Taiwanese subjectivity”. Chen is pres-
ident of the Taiwanese. Given that, it is normal that he
should enshrine their right to perceive history from their own
point of view.
The Xin Taïwan Xinwen Zhoukan sets out to respond to
the criticisms which state that the history textbooks merely
reflect an ideological project and the intrusion of politics in
education. It bases its argument on a quotation from Tu
Cheng-sheng, who accurately grasps the dominant mood in
Taiwanese society: “Those who think that my reform is
borne by ideology are judging it from the viewpoint of their
own subjective ideology”. The thesis of the pro-independ-
ence weekly newspaper is based on the argument which rea-
sons that the change of names should not be read through
the prism of the independence/unification debate, as it only
represents a justifiable effort to demolish the legacy of the
Kuomintang. For the weekly, this reform is moderate, and it
is even questionable that the history of China takes up more
space in Taiwan’s school textbooks than the history of
Japan, Korea, Vietnam or the other nations that occupy
Taiwan’s regional space… 
For the editorialist of Lienhebao, Chen Shui-bian, while
promising–during his two inaugural addresses in 2000 and
2004–not to declare independence, has already renounced
the construction of an independent Republic of Taiwan and
admitted that that was an unrealisable goal. Since then, he
has abandoned the state-building project and renounced (de
jure 法理台独) independence. But on the cultural, social
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10. “US Criticizes Changes in Names of Taiwan’s state companies”, AFP, 10 February 2007.
11. “Les relations entre les deux rives, bilan en 2006 et perspectives,” China Analysis, nº
11/12, January 2007. 
12. Philip Yang, “Doubly Dualistic Dilemma: US Strategy Towards China and Taiwan,”
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, vol. 6, nº 2, August 2006. 
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and education fronts, Chen is raising high the green flag of
what the Lienhebao calls “psychological independence”
(心理台独). His goal, says the editorialist, is to play on
the heartstrings while leading people to believe, and pre-
tending himself to believe, that a declaration of independ-
ence is still possible. Chen’s strategy consists in triggering a
shockwave through Taiwanese society and taking advantage
of the uproar that it unleashes in order to conceal the
absence of concrete results and to garner the citizens’ votes
while they are in a state of shock.
For the editorialist, there are two senses to the idea of
Taiwan’s independence. The first consists in opposing the
People’s Republic of China. The second describes the effort
to overthrow the People’s Republic of China. If the issue is
to refuse annexation by the communist regime, the policy of
desinicisation is meaningless. In its resolution on the future of
Taiwan, passed by the executive committee of the DPP in
1999 before the presidential elections, the party revised its
historical project of building a Republic of Taiwan, by declar-
ing that “Taiwan is already an independent and sovereign
state, its name is the Republic of China”. By recognising the
legitimacy of the Republic of China, the DPP became an
independence party in the primary sense of the term. And
according to the Lienhebao, it has espoused the majority
opinion of the Taiwanese population, the opinion that admits
the existence of a sovereign state on either side of the Taiwan
Strait. But if the DPP returns to its state-building project and
to its ideal of destroying the People’s Republic of China, the
most probable scenario is that, without the shell of the
Republic of China, Taiwan will be at the mercy of the
People’s Republic of China. According to the Lienhebao,
the desinicisation movement is first and foremost orchestrat-
ed against the Republic of China; it leads the Taiwanese to
look down on their own state and divides society by treating
those who still identify with the Republic of China as
“Chinese swine” (中国猪). Thus, by deploying such ener-
gy against the Republic of China, the only effect obtained by
the DPP is to weaken still further Taiwan’s position in rela-
tion to China, by confronting it with a divided society, and,
in the final analysis, relaying Beijing’s efforts to accelerate the
elimination of the People’s Republic of China.
Philip Yang notes that the wave of name changes of state-
owned enterprises has provoked an unusual reaction from
the State Department in the USA, which has declared that
it does not support “the administrative measures taken by
the Taiwanese authorities that could give the impression of
unilaterally changing the status of Taiwan or of setting
course for independence((10)”. For this academic, this new
initiative of the DPP is far less ideological than strategic. It
aims to create the conditions necessary for a good showing
in the legislative elections in December, then in the presi-
dential elections in 2008, by a tactic of divide and conquer
and by erasing any memory of the total absence of results
from public action since the re-election of Chen Shui-bian in
2004. But in this perspective, the DPP is forgetting that
desinicisation could trigger a new crisis in the Taiwan Strait.
It is from this viewpoint that Philip Yang puts forward an
analysis of how the security triangle will work based on the
case of the desinicisation measures. For him, the trend
towards the stabilisation of relations across the Strait over
the last two years can be explained as much by the new strat-
egy of Hu Jintao((11) as by the role played by Washington of
double dissuasion and maintenance of the political and mil-
itary status quo((12). The American statements, motivated by
the desire to maintain stability in cross-Strait relations, have
sought to forestall a direction reaction from China against
the desinicisation on Taiwan. For recent history has shown
that any explosion of verbal violence on the part of China
against Taiwan has been counter-productive. On the other
hand, faced with the American reprimands, Cho Jung tai,
secretary general of the presidential office, could only
attempt to close this chapter by declaring that Taiwan object-
ed to any interference in its domestic affairs((13).
A third critical viewpoint is that of Lin Huo-wang, who
begins his analysis by denouncing the absence of social dia-
logue and the expeditious methods of the government. The
changes of name will cause the state-owned enterprises in
question to lose tens of millions of Taiwanese dollars((14).
Could this public money not have been better spent on
improving the economic environment or on social services?
The DPP’s approach is clear and nothing new: from the
beginning of 2007, the party has wanted to take the initia-
tive and define the theme on which the next elections will
be played out. In the past, the DPP has used this strategy
repeatedly, with effectiveness far superior to that of its polit-
ical opponents, who have always failed to place the question
of economic growth at the heart of the election debate. The
new wave of desinicisation suggests that the DPP will again
seek to place the question of national identity at the heart of
the next electoral jousts. However, with the change of
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13. “Government Brushes off US Criticism,” Taipei Times, 11 February 2007. 
14. For example, the estimated cost of changing the name of the Post is in excess of 1.5
million euros, but Chen Shui-bian has justified his action by reckoning that the enter-
prises would gain in competitiveness in the medium term thanks to a better visibility,
and that it was normal to “spend a modest sum for future generations.”
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names of the state-owned enterprises, the DPP has chosen
an issue where, according to all the surveys, a majority of the
island’s population disapprove of the government’s action.
For Lin Huo-wang, this can be explained by the fact that the
real motivation of Chen Shui-bian is to consolidate the
dependence of the candidate who will represent the DPP in
the presidential elections in 2008 on him and his political
line. In these circumstances, the principal preoccupation
would be to avoid his name being sullied by the corruption
case that, for the moment, only affects his wife, as the
Constitution of the Republic of China provides for criminal
immunity of the president during his mandate. Wu Shu-chen
has refused six times, for health reasons, to appear before
the court. According to Lin Huo-wang, the presidential cou-
ple is seeking to gain time. Given that, Chen Shui-bian
wants to impose himself as the person who will “make” the
next president of Taiwan in order to benefit from the protec-
tion of the next head of state… A line of reasoning that has
the merit of revealing the distrust of some members of the
island’s elite in judicial independence… •
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